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BEHAVIORAL ANTITRUST AND
MONOPOLIZATION
Maurice E. Stucke*
ABSTRACT
One hot topic is whether Google has violated the antitrust laws. Another important topic is how behavioral economics can enrich antitrust policy. This
article examines two implications of behavioral economics on antitrust monopolization law. The article first discusses trial-and-error learning as an entry
barrier. This is timely given the current debate over the entry barriers of the
search engine market. The article next discusses behavioral exploitation to
maintain a monopoly. The behavioral economics literature can help explain the
European Commission's tying claims against Microsoft, why the Commission's
original remedy failed, and the benefits and risks of the Commission's remedy
involving its subsequent prosecution of Microsoft over Internet browsers.
JEL: L12; Lll; L40; A1; L63; D42

I. INTRODUCTION
Behavioral economics "is now mainstream."' Some time ago, the economics
literature moved beyond the Chicago School's strong assumptions of perfectly rational market participants who pursue, with willpower, their economic
self-interest. Over the past twenty years, the economic literature has increasingly recognized, and measured, how: (1) willpower is imperfect; (2) people
will incur costs to punish unfair behavior; (3) people care about treating
others, and being treated, fairly; and (4) biases and heuristics affect
decision-making. Figure 1 shows the trends for the phrases "behavioral economics" and "neoclassical economic theory" based on a search of books on
Google Books Ngram Viewer, which "displays a graph showing how...
phrases have occurred in a corpus of books" between 1960 and 2008 for all
English books.
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Figure 1. Trends for the phrases "behavioral economics" and "neoclassical economic theory,"
1960-2008
Source: GOOGLE BOOKS NGRAM VIEWER, http://ngrams.googlelabs.com/info.

On the consumer protection side, the U.S. Federal Trade Commission
(FTC) many years ago recognized behavioral biases 2 and offered behavioral
remedies.3 Today, organizations, including the Organisation for Economic
Co-operation and Development (OECD),4 American Bar Association's
Section of Antitrust Law, 5 Canada's International Development Research7
Center, 6 the British Institute of International and Comparative Law,
and the American Antitrust Institute,8 are considering behavioral
economics' implications on antitrust policy. Competition officials at the
2

See, e.g., Arthur Murray Studio of Washington, Inc. v. Fed. Trade Comm'n, 458 F.2d 622,

625 (5th Cir. 1972) ("The record is replete with trick advertisements to draw prospects, sham
dancing analysis tests, relay salesmanship, some under secret electronic supervision by
management, promises of social status and companionship, psychological sales techniques
based on past unpleasant experiences (described as X-Factor or "past is black" technique). In
many instances these tactics added up to cajolery and coercion. Many were reduced to
tears."); Lichtenstein v. Fed. Trade Comm'n, 194 F2d 607, 611 (9th Cir. 1952) (the FTC
can prevent the "'pestilence' of lotteries which 'enters every dwelling ... reaches every class ...
and preys upon' and 'plunders the ignorant and simple"') (quoting Phalen v. Virginia, 49
U.S. 163 (1850)).
3 See, e.g., 16 C.F.R. pt. 429 (cooling-off periods).
4 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Hearing on Competition and
Behavioural Economics (June 2012), http://www.oecd.org/documentl43/0,3746,en_264937463_48742443_1_1_1_37463,00.html#BehEco
5 Panel Discussion at 60th American Bar Association Section of Antitrust Law Spring Meeting,
Washington, D.C.: Behavioral Economics in Antitrust and Consumer Protection Law (Mar.
2012); Panel Discussion at 59th American Bar Association Section of Antitrust Law Spring
Meeting Behavioral Economics: Departing from the Rational-Actor Model? (Mar. 2011).
6 See, e.g., 5th IDRC Pre-ICN Forum on Competition and Development, Istanbul, Turkey
(Apr. 2010).
7 Competition Law Forum on Behavioral Economics, British Inst. of Int'l and Comparative
Law (July 2009), http://www.biicl.org/clf/clfmeetings2009.
3 Ninth Annual Conference: The Next Antitrust Agenda, American Antitrust Institute (June
18,
2008), http://www.antitrustinstitute.org/content/9th-annual-conference-next-antitrustagenda (audio recordings).
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FTC, 9 European Commission, 10 and the United Kingdom's Office of Fair
Trading" have accepted the limitations in neoclassical economic theory in
depicting reality under all, or nearly all, circumstances.
Consequently, one topical issue is: how can behavioral economics enrich
antitrust policy? Behavioral economics can inform our conception of competition. In relaxing the assumption of rationality (starting from the Chicago
School's strong rationality assumptions), a more dynamic theory of competition emerges.' 2 Firms compete to de-bias, better adapt, better innovate
through iterative modifications to their products and services, and forge
identities that maximize their workers' talents. Behavioral economics, as I
discuss elsewhere, can inform the sources and risks of the market failure of

cartels,'

3

mergers,'

6
generally. 1

4

and monopolies,' 5 and inform competition policy

9 See J. Thomas Rosch, Comm'r, Fed. Trade Comm'n, Behavioral Economics: Observations
Regarding Issues that Lie Ahead, Remarks at the Vienna Competition Conference (June 9,
2010), http:llwww.ftc.gov/speeches/rosch/lO0609viennaremarkspdf;
J. Thomas Rosch,
Comm'r, Fed Trade Comm'n, Managing Irrationality: Some Observations on Behavioral
Economics and the Creation of the Consumer Financial Protection Agency, Remarks at the
Conference on the Regulation of Consumer Financial Products (Jan. 6, 2010), http://
www.ftc.gov/speeches/rosch/100106financial-productspdf.
10 See, e.g., Emanuele Ciriolo, Behavioural Economics in the European Commission: Past, Present
and Future, OXERA AGENDA (Jan. 2011); Eliana Garc~s-Tol6n, The Impact of Behavioral
Economics on Consumer and Competition Policies, 6 COMPETITION POL'Y INT'L 145 (2010);
Press Release, European Union Comm'n for Consumers, Why Consumers Behave the Way
They Do: Commissioner Kuneva Hosts High Level Conference on Behavioural Economics
(Nov.
28,
2008),
http:l/europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/08/
1836&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN.
1 Office of Fair Trading (UK), The Impact of Price Frames on Consumer Decision Making
(2010),
http://www.oft.gov.uk/shared oft/economicresearch/OFT1 226.pdf;
Matthew
Bennett, John Fingleton, Amelia Fletcher, Liz Hurley & David Ruck, What Does Behavioral
Economics Mean for Competition Policy?, 6 COMPETITION POL'Y INT'L 111, 118 (2010);
Amelia Fletcher, Chief Economist, Office of Fair Trading, Address at the European
Commission Consumer Affairs Conference: What Do Policy-Makers Need from Behavioural
Economists? (Nov. 28, 2008), available at http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/conferences/docs/
AF-presentation-en.pdf.
12 Maurice E. Stucke, ReconsideringCompetition, 81 MIss. L.J. 107 (2011).
13 Maurice E. Stucke, Am I a Price-Fixer? A Behavioral Economics Analysis of Cartels, in
CRIMINALISING CARTELS: A CRITICAL INTERDISCIPLINARY STUDY OF AN INTERNATIONAL

REGULATORY MOVEMENT (Caron Beaton-Wells & Ariel Ezrachi eds., Hart Publishing 2011);
Maurice E. Stucke, Moralityand Antitrust, 2006 COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 443 (2006).
14 Amanda P. Reeves & Maurice E. Stucke, Behavioral Antitrust, 86 IND. L.J. 1527, 1559
(2011); Maurice E. Stucke, Behavioral Economists at the Gate: Antitrust in the Twenty-First
Century, 38 Loy. U. Cm. L.J. 513 (2007).
15 Maurice E. Stucke, How Do (and Should) Competition Authorities Treat a Dominant Firm's
Deception?, 63 SMU L. REv. 1069 (2010); Maurice E. Stucke, Should the Government
Prosecute Monopolies?, 2009 U. ILL. L. REv. 497 (2009).
16 Maurice E. Stucke, Is Intent Relevant?, J.L. ECON. & POL'Y (forthcoming 2012), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract= 1992761 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn. 1992761;
Maurice
E. Stucke, The Behavioral Antitrust Gambit, in INTERNATIONAL RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON

COMPETITION LAW (Ariel Ezrachi ed.,

Edward Elgar Publishing forthcoming 2012);
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This article examines two implications of behavioral economics on antitrust monopolization law. Part II discusses trial-and-error learning as an
entry barrier. This is timely given the current antitrust investigations of
Google, and debate over the entry barriers of the search engine market. Part
III discusses behavioral exploitation to maintain a monopoly. The behavioral
economics literature can help explain the European Commission's abusive
tying claims against Microsoft for its media player, why the Commission's
original remedy failed, and the benefits and risks of the Commission's
remedy involving its subsequent prosecution of Microsoft over Internet
browsers.

II. TRIAL-AND-ERROR LEARNING AS AN ENTRY BARRIER
A. Importance of Entry Analysis in Monopolization Cases
The ease in entering a market has long been important in any monopolization and attempted monopolization case brought under section 2 of the
Sherman Act. 17 As the U.S. Supreme Court said, "without barriers to entry
it would presumably be impossible to maintain supracompetitive prices for
an extended time."' 8 The assumption is that, in markets with low entry barriers, "sellers charging supracompetitive prices will soon attract new competitors." 19 Agencies and courts thus consider "market characteristics which

Maurice E. Stucke, What is Competition?, in THE GOALS OF COMPETITION LAw 27
(Academic Society for Competition Law ed., Edward Elgar Publishing 2012); Maurice
E. Stucke, Are People Self-Interested? The Implications of BehavioralEconomics on Competition
Policy, in MORE COMMON GROUND FOR INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION LAw? 3 (Academic
Society for Competition Law ed., Edward Elgar Publishing 2011); Maurice E. Stucke,
Reconsidering Antitrust's Goals, 53 B. C. L. RE. 551 (2012); Maurice E. Stucke,
Reconsidering Competition, supra note 12; Maurice E. Stucke, Money, Is That What I Want?
Competition Policy & the Role of Behavioral Economics, 50 SANTA CLARA L. REV 893 (2010);
Maurice E. Stucke, Antitrust 2025, 2 COMPETITION POL'Y INT'L ANTITRUST J. (2010),
availableat http:/lpapers.ssrn.comlsol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id= 1727251; Maurice E. Stucke,
New Antitrust Realism, GLOBAL COMPETITION PoL'Y MAG., Jan. 2009, http:ll
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid= 1323815.
17 Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colorado, Inc., 479 U.S. 104, 119 (1986); United States v. Am.
Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106, 183 (1911) ("By the gradual absorption of control over all the
elements essential to the successful manufacture of tobacco products and placing such
control in the hands of seemingly independent corporations serving as perpetual barriers to
the entry of others into the tobacco trade.").
S Cargill, 479 U.S. at 119 (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475
U.S. 574, 591 n.15 (1986)).
19 See Bailey v. Allgas, Inc., 284 E3d 1237, 1256 (11th Cir. 2002); United States v. Microsoft
Corp., 253 E3d 34, 81, 82 (D.C. Cir. 2001) ("firm cannot possess monopoly power in a
market unless that market is also protected by significant barriers to entry"); AD/SAT v. AP,
181 F3d 216, 229 (2d Cir. 1999) (affirming summary judgment for defendant on attempted
monopolization claim and noting that the presence of "low barriers to market entry"
suggested that the defendant would "face significant competition from new entrants"); Oahu
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make it difficult or time-consuming for new firms to enter a market., 20 For
any monopolization or attempted monopolization claim, the plaintiff must
prove that the relevant market's entry barriers are "significant" and "substantial" enough to confer monopoly power.
Since entry analysis is critical in section 2 claims, it follows that the types
of entry barriers that courts recognize are also critical. One court stated,
"[a]nything that tends to inhibit firms from readily and easily entering the
marketplace can be analyzed as an entry barrier." 2 1 Other courts define
entry barriers more narrowly.2 2 Today, some well-accepted entry barriers
include: (1) manufacturing, distribution, and regulatory barriers, such as
"planning, design, and management; permitting, licensing, or other
approvals; construction, debugging, and operation of production facilities;

and promotion (including necessary introductory discounts), marketing, distribution, and satisfaction of customer testing and qualification requirements;" 23 (2) the entrant's time, expense, and likelihood to gain consumers'
confidence and trust 24 (especially for products with powerful chemicals that
may pose significant health risks, like hair relaxers); 25 and (3) the time,

Gas Serv., Inc. v. Pac. Res., Inc., 838 F.2d 360, 366 (9th Cit. 1988) ("A firm with a high
market share may be able to exert market power in the short run, but substantial market
power can persist only if there are significant and continuing barriers to entry") (quotations
omitted); Ball Mem'l Hosp., Inc. v. Mut. Hosp. Ins., Inc., 784 F.2d 1325, 1335 (7th Cir.
1986) (noting how "the lower the barriers to entry, and the shorter the lags of new entry, the
less power existing firms have").
20 Colorado Interstate Gas Co. v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co. of Am., 885 F2d 683, 697 (10th
Cir. 1989); Communication from the Commission - Guidance on the Commission's
Enforcement Priorities in Applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty to Abusive Exclusionary
Conduct by Dominant Undertakings, 2009 O.J. (C 45) (in assessing dominance, take into
account the competitive structure of the market, in particular "constraints imposed by the
credible threat of future expansion by actual competitors or entry by potential competitors
(expansion and entry)").
21 In reIBM Peripheral EDP Devices Antitrust Litig., 481 F Supp. 965, 976 (N.D. Cal. 1979),
aff'd sub nom. Transamerica Computer Co., Inc. v. Int'l Bus. Machines Corp., 698 F2d
1377 (9th Cir. 1983).
22 Los Angeles Land Co. v. Brunswick Corp., 6 F3d 1422, 1427-28 (9th Cir. 1993) (rejecting
the argument that one firm's anticompetitive conduct against another constitutes an entry
barrier, since it falls outside the treatise's definition of entry barriers as "either 'additional
long-run costs that were not incurred by incumbent firms but must be incurred by new
entrants,' or 'factors in the market that deter entry while permitting incumbent firms to earn
monopoly returns"' (quoting PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW
509-10 41409 (1992 Supp.))).
23 U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM'N, HoRIzONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES
§ 9

(Aug. 19, 2010), http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/hmg-2010.html.
24 United States v. H&R Block, Inc., Civ. Act. No. 11-00948 (BAH), 2011 WVL 5438955, at
*31-32 (D.D.C. Nov. 10, 2011).

25 U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM'N, COMMENTARY ON THE HORIZONTAL
MERGER GUIDELINES, at 39 (Mar. 2006).
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likelihood, and expense needed to develop strong brand awareness from
word-of-mouth customer referrals from a large customer base.26
Antitrust analysis in recent years has gone beyond narrowly defined
markets to vertical and horizontal competition among larger units, systems,
platforms, and alliances in which potential competition plays an important
analytical role. In these markets, another important entry barrier is network
effects. 27 Network effects can be direct or indirect. 28 Direct network effects
arise when a consumer's utility from a product (such as a telephone)
26

27

28

Compl. at ,151, United States v. H&R Block, Inc., Civ. Act. No. 1:1 1-cv-00948 (D.D.C. May
23, 2011); In re Serv. Corp. Int'l & Keystone N. Am. Inc., C-4284, 2010 WL 1249873 (Fed.
Trade Comm'n Mar. 24, 2010) (funeral services). One court said, "reputation alone does not
constitute a sufficient entry barrier in this Circuit." Am. Prof'l Testing Serv., Inc. v. Harcourt
Brace Jovanovich Legal & Prof'l Publ'ns, Inc., 108 F.3d 1147, 1154 (9th Cir. 1997) (citing
United States v. Syufy Enters., 903 F2d 659, 669 (9th Cir. 1990) ("We fail to see how the
existence of good will achieved through effective service is an impediment to, rather than the
natural result of, competition.") (citations omitted)). The statement is inconsistent with reality.
Companies recognize reputation as an entry barrier. See, e.g., In re Polypore Int'l, Inc., 2010
WL 866178 (FTC. Mar. 1, 2010) (company identifying as either "very high entry barriers" or
"somewhat high entry barriers": (1) "scale-based benefits"; (2) "experience, learning effects";
(3) "capital requirements"; and (4) "value of reputation, brand"); Robert Smiley, Empirical
Evidence on Strategic Entry Deterrence, 6 INT'L J. INDUS. ORG. 167, 170-72 (1988) (many
surveyed executives identified advertising and promoting the product intensively for the
purpose of creating sufficient product loyalty so that potential rivals would find entry less
attractive). The statement is also inconsistent with the case law, including the Ninth Circuit's.
See, e.g., Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568, 579 (1967) (finding
that the "major competitive weapon in the successful marketing of bleach is advertising" and "a
new entrant would be much more reluctant to face the giant Procter [& Gamble] than it would
have been to face the smaller Clorox"); Los Angeles Land Co. v. Brunswick Corp., 6 F.3d
1422, 1428 (9th Cir. 1993) (recognizing "main sources of entry barriers" as "(1) legal license;
(2) control over an essential or superior resource; (3) entrenched buyer preferences for
established brands or company reputations; and (4) capital market evaluations imposing higher
capital costs on new entrants"); U.S. Philips Corp. v. Wimdmere Corp., 861 E2d 695, 703
(Fed. Cir. 1988) (recognizing substantial, if not high entry barriers to the rotary electric shaver
market given "the need to have a well-known brand with wide consumer acceptance, the
limited number of brands that satisfy this requirement, and the substantial advertising
expenditures required to attain a foothold in the market").
Realcomp II, Ltd. v. Fed. Trade Comm'n, 635 F.3d 815, 829 (6th Cir. 2011) (affirming the
finding of Realcomp's substantial market power from MLS's market share, network effects, and
barriers to entry); Micwsoft, 253 E3d at 83 (requiring antitrust plaintiff to prove that (1)
"network effects were a necessary or even probable, rather than merely possible, consequence of
high market share in the browser market and (2) that a barrier to entry resulting from network
effects would be 'significant' enough to confer monopoly power"); In re Ebay Seller Antitrust
Litig., C 07-01882 JF (RS), 2010 WL 760433, at *10 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 4, 2010) (defendant
eBay not contesting significant barriers to entry to the online auctions market because of
network effects), aff'd 10-15642, 2011 WL 1749206 (9th Cir. May 9, 2011); Skydive Ariz.,
Inc. v. Quattrocchi, 2009 WL 2515616, at *2 (D. Ariz. Aug. 13, 2009) (finding under Daubert
that general economic principles on networks and network effects was reliable foundation);
Bristol Tech., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 42 F Supp. 2d 153, 169 (D. Conn. 1998); United States
v. Microsoft Corp., 1998 WL 614485, at *4 (D.D.C. Sept. 14, 1998).
Marina Lao, Networks, Access, and "Essential Facilities": From Terminal Railroad to Microsoft,
62 SMU L. REv. 557, 560-61 (2009).
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increases as others use the product.2 9 Indirect network effects arise when
people increasingly use a product or technology (for example, software platforms). The more people that use the platform, "the more there will be
invested in developing products compatible with that platform, which, in
30
turn reinforces the popularity of that platform with users."
Firms compete to dominate markets characterized by network effects. As
one product or standard increases in popularity, it trends toward dominance
"because the utility that a user derives from consumption of the good
increases with the number of other agents consuming the good."3 1 As
another court observed, "once dominance is achieved, threats come largely
from outside the dominated market, because the degree of dominance of
' 32
such a market tends to become so extreme."

B. Implications of Behavioral Economics on Entry Analysis
Entry analysis is important in any monopolization claim, but the analysis
traditionally assumed that firms and consumers behaved rationally, with willpower. 33 So what happens to entry analysis when one relaxes the rationality
assumption?
First, entry may or may not occur as neoclassical economic theory predicts.34 Second, behavioral economics can help explain why recoupment
and entry barriers play an important role in the courts' analysis of predatory
pricing claims.

35

29 Microsoft, 253 .3d at 49.
30 Case T-201/04, Microsoft Corp. v. Comm'n, 2007 E.C.R. 11-3601 (Ct. First Instance),
1061 [hereinafter CF1 Microsoft].
31 Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 49.
32 Novell, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 505 F3d 302, 308 (4th Cir. 2007).
33 Reeves & Stucke, supra note 14, at 1549-53, 1556.
34 Id. at 1554-60 (identifying lack of entry when neoclassical theory predicts otherwise);
Stucke, ReconsideringAntitrust's Goals, supra note 16, at 563-72; Avishalom Tor, The Fable of
Entry: Bounded Rationality,Market Discipline, and Legal Policy, 101 MICH. L. REv. 482, 50508 (2002) (discussing the principle of overconfidence in the context of entry decision
making).
35 A firm may intend to monopolize a market by undertaking costly and prolonged predatory
pricing. Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Ross-Simmons Hardwood Lumber Co., Inc., 549 U.S. 312,
319 (2007) ("For that investment to be rational, a firm must reasonably expect to recoup in
the long run at least its original investment with supracompetitive profits."). If firms were
rational profit maximizers, they would not price below average variable cost and incur losses
unless their predatory-pricing scheme would likely succeed; that is, they would recover "the
losses suffered plus the profits that would have been realized absent the scheme." Id.
Otherwise, the Court observed, "[w]ithout such a reasonable expectation, a rational firm
would not willingly suffer definite, short-run losses." Id. So if courts presume firms are
rational, the plaintiff should prevail by showing the defendant priced below average variable
cost with the intent to monopolize the market. Nonetheless, despite the firm's below-cost
pricing, courts can conclude that the aspiring monopolist was overconfident: if the firm
sought subsequently to recoup (charging supracompetitive prices) its investment in
predation, rational profit-maximizers would enter to rescue the consumer. Vollrath
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Third, behavioral economics can explain networks effects through
herding. Herding among investors can lead to irrational exuberance or pessimism over stocks, real estate, and tulips. 36 Fads emerge where a consumer's utility from an item (such as a designer bag) depends on who else
owns the item (for example, perceived trend-setters 3 7 or masses 38 ).
Consumers, at times, are confronted with competing, incompatible technologies. In choosing, consumers prefer the technology platform that others
will likely choose-the more popular platform (for example, VHS versus
Betamax, Blu-ray versus HD DVD, Google's Android versus Apple 39 )-will
attract more supporting complements developed for that platform. 40 Each
consumer may prefer the superior technology, but forego it for the perceived
popular one. 4 1 In believing that others will opt for the subpar technology,
consumers can choose the subpar technology and contribute to the suboptimonopoly
mal outcome. A firm may seek to secure (or maintain) 4 its
3
42
through herding, using deceptive statements and vaporware.
A fourth implication if firms and consumers have biases and heuristics is
learning as an entry barrier; namely, companies to effectively compete need
a minimum level of trial-and-error feedback. Firms can have imperfect
knowledge about current and future consumer preferences, a blurred and

Co. v. Sammi Corp., CV
focusing on recoupment,
possibility of maintaining
entrants whose costs are
1455 (9th Cir. 1993).

85-820 MRP, 1989 WL 201632 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 20, 1989) ("In
courts consider primarily evidence of market structure and the
monopoly prices for a comfortable period without inviting in new
as low as or lower than those of the monopolist."), aff'd, 9 F3d

36 JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, A SHORT HISTORY OF FINANCIAL EUPHORIA (Penguin Press

1993); Naomi E. Boyd, Bahattin Buyuksahin, Jeffrey H. Harris & Michael S. Haigh, The
Prevalence, Sources, and Effects of Herding (Sept. 13, 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract= 1359251 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1359251.
37 See, e.g., THORSTEIN VEBLEN, THE THEORY OF THE LEISURE CLASS 25,

33 (1899)

(discussing primary motive to accumulate wealth is pecuniary emulation).
38 Peter Sheridan Dodds & Duncan J. Watts, Influentials, Networks, and Public Opinion
Formation, 34 J. CONSUMER RES. 441-58 (2007).
39 Dylan Byers, Google and Apple Battle for Developers' Hearts and Minds, at Google I/0
Conference, Fight Between Android, iPhone Rages on, ADWEEK (May 12, 2011), http://
www.adweek.com/news/technology/
google-and-apple-battle-developers-hearts-and-minds- 131550.
40 See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 84 F Supp. 2d 9, 20 (D.D.C. 1999), aff'd in part,
revd in part, 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
41 JOHN CASSIDY, How MARKETS FAIL: THE LOGIC OF ECONOMIC CALAMITIES

130-31

(Picador 2009).
42 Compl. ' 10, In re Intel Corp., FTC Docketable No. 9288 (Dec. 16, 2009), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/adjpro/d9341/index.shtm [hereinafter FTC Intel Compl.] (alleging how
Intel engaged in deceptive acts and practices to mislead consumers and the public, including
pressuring independent software vendors to label their products as compatible with Intel and
not to similarly label with competitor's products' names or logos, even though these
competitor microprocessor products were compatible).
43 Stucke, Dominant Firm's Deception, supra note 15, at 1097-1102.
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changing understanding of their goals and preferences, and a limited repertoire of actions to cope with whatever problems they face. 4 4 Consumers have
changing and, at times, inconsistent preferences. 45
In this evolutionary trial-and-error process, firms "try out different
problem solutions and can learn from the feedback of the market, which
of their specific products and technological solutions are the superior
ones." 4 6 Firms and consumers make mistakes, readjust, and undertake
new strategies. The competitive process "is inherently a process of trial and
error with no stable end-state considered by the participants in the
process." 47
Firms compete by continually learning about customer preferences and
competitors' experimentation and by experimenting themselves with new
technologies, routines, and ways of organizing. This requires a minimum
amount of trial-and-error feedback. a
Semiconductor chip manufacturers, as economist EM. Scherer discusses,
make mistakes during the early production stages. They adjust their processes and thereby lower their manufacturing costs for their next batch.4 9

44 MAX H. BAZERMAN & DON A. MOORE, JUDGMENT IN MANAGERIAL DECISION MAKING

(7th ed., Wiley 2008); Giovanni Dosi & Luigi Marengo, On the Evolutionary and Behavioral
Theories of Organizations:A Tentative Roadmap, 18 ORG. Sci. 491, 492, 494 (2007).
45 See, e.g., Richard Layard, Happiness & Public Policy: A Challenge to the Profession, 116 ECON.
J. C24, C24 (2006) (noting from happiness economic literature how "tastes are not giventhe happiness we get from what we have is largely culturally determined"); Steven
C. Michael & Tracy Pun Palandjian, OrganizationalLearning and New Product Introductions,
21 J. PROD. INNOVATION MGMT. 268, 270 (2004) (discussing shampoo industry dynamism
where consumers with changing tastes seek variety).
46 Wolfgang Kerber, Competition, Innovation and MaintainingDiversity Through Competition
Law,
in ECONOMIC APPROACHES TO COMPETITION LAW: FOUNDATIONS AND LIMITATIONS (Josef

Drexl et al. eds., 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract= 1543725.
47 Frangois Moreau, The Role of the State in Evolutionary Economics, 28 CAMBRIDGE J. ECON.
847, 851 (2004).
48 See, e.g., In re Polypore Int'l, Inc., 2010 WL 866178 (Fed. Trade Comm'n Mar. 1, 2010)
(noting Microporous's intangible assets included "a favorable reputation with customers and
the benefit of learning by doing, which is accumulated through having produced the product
for a number of years"); United States v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 430 F. Supp. 729, 760
(D. Md. 1976) ("Design of gas saws requires extensive empirical research which cannot be
bypassed through reference to engineering texts and the like. This process of trial and error,
even with competent personnel, is a gradual one of refinement."); Compl., United States
v. Amcor Ltd., No. 1:10-cv-00973, 2010 WL 2724165 (D.D.C. filed June 10, 2010)
(alleging "technical know-how necessary to design and successfully manufacture packaging
that is able to pass customers' qualification tests is difficult to obtain and is learned through
a time-consuming trial-and-error process").
"9 Frederic M. Scherer, Abuse of Dominance by High Technology Enterprises:A Comparison of US.
and E.C. Approaches, 38 J. INDUS. & BuS. ECON. 39, 49-50 (2011); INTEL COR, ANNUAL
REPORT FOR THE FISCAL YEAR ENDED DECEMBER 26, 2009 (SEC FORM 10-K), at 9 (filed
Feb. 22, 2010), available at http://www.intc.com/annuals.cfm ("As unit volumes of a product
grow, production experience is accumulated and costs typically decrease, further competition
develops, and prices decline.").
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Consequently, aside from the direct and indirect network effects, 50 Intel's
scale enables it secure a cost advantage where others cannot.
At least in the early stages of production, one learns "by doing," how to
avoid defective chips and increase volume as additional chips are produced.
Typically, each doubling and redoubling of cumulative chip volume reduces
unit batch costs by 20 to 30 percent. Learning curves tend to be linear on
doubly logarithmic coordinates, and their "slope" is stated to be 100 minus
the percentage by which costs are reduced with each doubling of cumulative
output. This leads, among other things, to a phenomenon often ignored in
the economics literature: because each batch causes learning that reduces
future batch costs, marginal costs (accounting for both current costs and the
impact on future costs) are far below current batch costs-more so when the
future cost impact is not discounted to present value, as compared to when
the impact of learning on future costs is discounted.5 '
Smaller competitors sell only the initial batches. Intel, on the other hand,
uses this internal trial-and-error feedback loop to increase its productive efficiencies over successive batches of microprocessors.
Firms can also learn through external networks with suppliers and customers. 5 2 Here scale is critical when consumer preferences are unstable or unpredictable. To keep abreast with changing customer preferences, firms also
rely on trial-and-error feedback loops. Firms experiment with options,
monitor customer reaction to their (and competitors') offerings, and readjust. The more feedback firms receive from more consumers, the more
the firms can refine their products and services, the better they can match
their technology to customers' preferences, the greater their competitive advantage. Thus, to effectively compete, firms may need a minimum level of
customer feedback, so that they can more accurately predict customer
desires.
This behavioral entry barrier will increase in significance going forward.
Many online vendors, such as Amazon, can offer consumers thousands of
options. But with too many options, consumers are overwhelmed. They
avoid choosing (or regret their choice).5 3 Thus, an important facet of competition is pairing specific products that likely match the consumer's
50 FTC Intel Compl., supra note 42, 4 10 (discussing the need simultaneously to secure a large

number of users to make the product attractive to software developers and to secure the
efforts of software developers to make the product attractive to users, and Intel's success "in
obtaining commitments from many computer manufacturers and software vendors to build
computers and write software for Intel's new 64-bit Merced microprocessor, even though the
product will not be available for nearly two years").
s Scherer, supra note 49, at 49-50.
52 Eric von Hippel, People Don't Need a Profit Motive to Innovate, HARV. Bus. REV., Nov. 2011,
at 37 (discussing user innovation); Ikujiro Nonaka & Hirotaka Takeuchi, The Big Idea: The
Wise Leader, HARV. Bus. RE., May 2011, at 64.
53 Simona Botti & Sheena S. Iyengar, The Dark Side of Choice: When Choice Impairs Social
Wlfare, 25 J. PUB. POL'Y & MARKETING 24, 26 (2006) (discussing information overload,
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preferences. For example, suppose one seeks to purchase Philip Glass's
soundtrack Koyaanisqatsi on Amazon.com. At the bottom of screen page is
Customers Who Bought This Item Also Bought, which directs one to other possible recordings of interest.
Companies, like Amazon, are mining their traffic data to better predict
books, movies, and music of consumers liking. 54 Companies with more subscribers (like Apple's iTunes) and more data on consumer interests (such as
Google, which can mine data across its products) have more opportunities
to predict what movies, books, or music the subscribers would enjoy,
monitor actual selections, and revise their predictions, thereby adapting to
evolving consumer preferences and products. With this scale from behavioral
learning, the company can enjoy a significant competitive advantage and decrease the likelihood that an entrant can threaten its market power.

C. Trial-and-Error Learning as an Entry Barrier in the Search
Engine Market
A hot antitrust issue today is the search engine market, and "whether barriers to entry exist that might prevent new competitors" into the market.55
To help consumers navigate the Internet, Google's and Microsoft's search
engines use algorithms to identify web pages that match the consumers'
search terms. In this two-sided market, the better the search engine is at
providing accessible and relevant information, the more popular the search
engine is for consumers, the more attractive the search engine is to advertisers seeking to target those consumers, and the greater 56the advertising
revenue the search engine garners compared to competitors.

where an increase in options raises the cognitive costs in comparing and evaluating the
options and leads to suboptimal decision strategies).
54 Amazon.com, Letter to Shareholders, in 2010 ANNUAL REPoRT (Apr. 27, 2011), available at
http://phx.corporate-ir.net/phoenix.zhul?c=97664&p=irol-reportsAnnual ("For example, our
search engine employs data mining and machine learning algorithms that run in the background
to build topic models, and we apply information extraction algorithms to identify attributes and
extract entities from unstructred descriptions, allowing customers to narrow their searches and
quickly find the desired product. We consider a large number of factors in search relevance to
predict the probability of a customer's interest and optimize the ranking of results.").
55 The Powe of Google: Serving Consumers or Threatening Competition?: Hearingbefore the Subcomm.
on Antitrust, Competition Policy and Consumer Rights U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee, 112th
Cong. (Sept. 21, 2011), available at http://judiciary.senate.gov/hearings/testimony.cfm?id=
3d9031b47812de2592c3baeba64d93cb&witid=3d9031b47812de2592c3baeba64d93cb-0-1
[hereinafter Senate Google Hearings] (Statement of Patrick Leahy, U.S. Senator, U.S. Senate); see
also Spencer Weber Waller, Antitrust and Social Networking, N.C. L. REv. (forthcoming 2012),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract= 1948690.
56 See Competitive Impact Statement, United States v. Google, (D.D.C. filed Apr. 8, 2011);
Author's Guild v. Google Inc., 770 F Supp. 2d 666, 683 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (recognizing
"Google's market power in the online search market").

556

Journalof Competition Law & Economics

Google's CEO testified before a Senate antitrust subcommittee that "competition is only one click away."57 Entry barriers, he testified, were nonexistent: "Using Google is a choice (and a free one), and there are no barriers
www.nextag.com,
www.kayak.com,
to
navigating
consumers
to
www.bing.com, www.yelp.com, www.expedia.com, or any other website." 5 8 If
entry barriers are indeed low or non-existent, then Google cannot monopolize
the search engine market, and thus cannot violate section 2 of the Sherman
Act.
Under neoclassical economic theory, an antitrust plaintiff would have a
hard time proving that (1) network effects were probable and (2) if even if
the effects were probable, the resulting entry barriers were sufficiently high
to confer monopoly power in the search engine market. Given the ease to
run the search terms on different search engines, one would expect a competitive equilibrium among search engines, whereby consumers obtain
roughly similar results for the same search terms. If one search engine provides less relevant or complete listings, it can hire a competitor's engineers
to develop better algorithms. Absent another point of differentiation (such
59
as better graphics or quicker results) or a tipping point, one search engine

should not dominate the market.
But two behavioral forces are at play here. The first is, as the next part
discusses, the power of default options. It is relatively easy to run the same
search on multiple search engine websites, like Bing and Google, but if consumers lack time or inclination to use multiple search engines, 60 then entry
becomes more difficult. Google paid, and continues to pay, substantial
amounts to be the default search engine. 6 '
The second behavioral force is the importance of scale in trial-and-error
experimentation. In some industries, as a company secures more data on
human behavior, a new form of network effects emerges. A search engine
cannot read the consumer's mind. 6 2 Google does not know when the consumer types "apple" and "orange," whether she is searching for fruit or
technology companies. When a consumer types "orange," and "apple,"
57 Senate Google Hearings, supra note 55 (Testimony of Eric Schmidt, Executive Officer, Google

Inc.).
58 Id. at 7.
59 See, e.g., Jean Gabszewicz, Paolo Giorgio Garella & Nathalie Sonnac, Newspapers' Market
Shares and the Theory of the Circulation Spiral, 19 INFo. EcoN. & POL'Y 405-13 (2007)
(examining death spiral theory of daily newspaper in two-newspaper towns whereby
circulation decline causes advertisers to support the other competitor).
60 Steve Lohr, Can These Guys Make You 'Bing'?, N.Y. TIMES, July 31, 2011, at 5 (saying
greatest hurdle for Bing, according to Microsoft executive, is consumer habits, which favors
Google).
61 Steve Lohr, The Default Choice, So Hard to Resist, N.Y TIMEs, Oct. 16, 2011, at 5.
62 Eye-Tracking Google SERPs: 5 Tales of Pizza, THE DAILY SEO BLOG (Oct. 5th, 2011), http://
www.seomoz.org/blogeyetracking-google-serps
Google searches).

(discussing custom

eye-tracking data for
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Google quickly generates an "opinion as to what information users will find
most useful." 6 3 Google has the benefit of observing which, if any, links its
users actually choose. If many choose a link that was originally offered down
the list (say on the third or fourth page of results), Google's algorithms can
harvest that information to move that link up the list; Google demotes less
frequently tapped suggested links down the list. 6 4 Thus the more consumers
use the search engine and the more searches they run, the more trials the
search engine company has in predicting consumer preferences, the more
feedback the search engine receives of any errors, and the quicker the search
engine can respond with recalibrating its offerings.6 5 Increased traffic
volumes makes more experiments possible, thereby improving search
results.6 6 With more trial and error, the search engine can adapt to changing
preferences, improve its product, and thereby attract additional consumers
to that search engine compared to competitor sites. 67 Google's popularity
enables more trial-and-error experimentation, which in turn increases its
popularity. Google with its massive number of search users can "tap into the
'wisdom of the users' to identify the most relevant websites for any given
query.68 It can innovate with predictive search technology (such as suggesting search phrases that refine the consumer's search) and quickly provide information that obviates the need for further searching.
A new entrant can hire Google's tech talent, but it still lacks the scale of this
trial-and-error experimentation. With fewer trials, entrants have fewer opportunities to predict search terms (or what the consumer wants to know).
Entrants have fewer opportunities to observe subsequent errors and to perceive
trends (consumers' search terms relating to a hot topic). Their ability to

63 As Google's CEO testified,
When a consumer enters search terms, those terms are processed by the search engine's
mathematical algorithms, which determine the probability that any given webpage will
be responsive to the search. The user then receives results that are rank-ordered based
on the search engine's judgment of the likelihood that each result matches what the user
was seeking in entering the search terms. This process necessarily depends on multiple
variables and constant refinement.
Senate Google Hearings, supra note 55, at 2 (Testimony of Eric Schmidt, Executive Officer,

Google Inc.).

64 Lohr, Bing, supra note 60, at 1.

65 Id. at 3 ("Consumer testing is key to the algorithm refining process, and Google uses both
human reviewers and samples of real search traffic in order to measure whether a proposed
algorithm change improves the user experience or not.").

66 Teresa Vecchi, Jerome Vidal & Viveca Fallenius, The MicrosoftlYahoo! Search Business Case, 2
EuR. COMM'N COMPETITION PoL'y NEWSL. at 46 (2010).

67 Id. at 46 (EC finding that the "quality and relevance of the algorithmic search engine" as
"the most important factor in attracting users to a particular search engine").

68 Senate Google Hearings, supra note 55, at 2 (Testimony of Eric Schmidt, Executive Officer,
Google Inc.).
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identify sites that consumers prefer likely will remain inferior, so the entrant
remains at a competitive disadvantage in attracting consumers and advertisers.
Recognizing this, a smaller search engine can specialize in specific functions. 69 For example, consumers today bypass the general search engine to
find travel and flight options on travel-specific Internet sites, such as Kayak,
Expedia, and Travelocity. Consumers can search for books directly on
Amazon's website. They can review restaurants on Zagat, which Google
acquired. 7 ° Smaller search engines complement, rather than replace,
Google.
One downside in becoming a niche player is that the search engine can
lose an important segment of the population. As Microsoft observed,
there's this kind of inverse power loss, where 39 percent of the users account for 66
percent of all the searches. I think of them as the heavy searchers. Ourselves and Yahoo!
and others have been losing heavy searchers for the last number of years. Since the Bing
launch, we've actually inverted that, we're actually growing heavy searchers. And when
you look at the demographics, we are over-indexed on 18 to 24 year olds now as a result
of those heavy users. Before that, we 7were
over-indexed on 65-year plus in terms of
1
demographics, which is our MSN base.

So if your audience is primarily over 65 years old, your searches may start
skewing to their preferences, which may differ from younger audiences.
While the entry barriers are higher than Google's CEO asserts, the
general search market is not impenetrable. "In 1998, the year Google was
incorporated," observed its CEO, "Yahoo!, which had hundreds of millions
of users, was declared the winner of the 'search engine wars'-it got twice as
many visitors as its nearest competitor and had 'eviscerated the competition.' ' , 72 Thus, Google was able to penetrate and displace Yahoo. Today
Microsoft believes it can succeed with its search engine Bing. Its battle
against Google, according to industry executives and analysts, is costing

Microsoft billions of dollars.73 But Microsoft did not enter de novo. Instead,
it justified its Yahoo partnership as necessary to achieve this scale of behavioral trial-and-error learning. 74 Before the partnership, fewer people used
69 Daniel A. Crane, Search Neutrality and Referral Dominance, 8 J. COMPEITION L. & ECON.

(2012).

70 Brian Womack,

Google Discloses $151 Million Price Tag for Acquisition of Zagat Service,

BLOOMBERG, Oct. 26, 2011, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-10-27/google-spent-151-

million-on-zagat-review-service-last-quarter.html.
71 Yusuf Mehdi, Senior Vice President, Online Audience Business, Remarks at the Credit
Suisse Annual Technology Conference (Dec. 1, 2009).
72 Senate Google Hearings, supra note 55, at 2 (Testimony of Eric Schmidt, Executive Officer,
Google Inc.).
73 Lohr, Bing, supra note 60, at 1.
74 In December 2009, Microsoft partnered with Yahoo! to provide the exclusive algorithmic
and paid search platform for the Yahoo! web sites. Microsoft believed this agreement would
allow it over time to improve the effectiveness and increase the value of its "search offering
through greater scale in search queries and an expanded and more competitive search and
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to Google.75

As

it turns out there's a feedback loop in the search business, where the most searches you
serve, or paid ad searches you serve, the more you learn about what people click on,
what's relevant, and it turns out that scale drives knowledge which then can turn around
and redrive innovation and relevance. So, actually even our ability to understand our customers and innovate around that is enhanced by putting the two assets together. It's not
just putting them together, but putting them together in this business, which is unlike
other businesses, there is a return to scale from seeing
that much more Internet activity
76
than either Yahoo! or Microsoft sees independently.

Microsoft positions Bing as a decision-engine (providing consumers with information to help with decisions, such as good restaurants nearby). Bing's
consumer usage has increased, but not at Google's expense. 77 To gain an
additional advantage, Microsoft entered into a search arrangement with the
social network site, Facebook.7 s Its relationship with the largest social
network site, Google's CEO testified, may provide Microsoft "a tremendous
advantage" if "Facebook and Bing can harness the power of search algorithms and a customer's social graph to answer a query."7 9 It remains
unclear whether Microsoft's
Bing will attain the necessary scale to threaten
80
Google's monopoly.
Consequently, Google's dominance of the search market is not guaranteed. But, besides conventional network effects, courts going forward should
consider trial-and-error learning barriers in industries where consumer preferences are unstable and hard to predict.

advertising marketplace." MICROsOFT CoRP., ANNUAL REPORT FOR THE FIscAL YEAR
ENDED JUNE 30, 2011 (SEC FoRM 10-K), at 6 (filed July 28, 2011), available at http://

apps.shareholder.com/sec/viewerContent.aspx?companyid=MSFT&docid=8062497.
75 The European Commission, for example, found that Google's share of the search and

76

advertising markets in the European Economic Area was over 90 percent. Vecchi, supra note
66, at 46.
Transcript from Remarks from the Conference Call Held by Steve Ballmer, Chief Executive
Officer, Microsoft, and Carol Bartz, Chief Executive Officer, Yahoo!, to Announce the
Search Engine Agreement Between Yahoo! and Microsoft, MICROSOFr NEWS CENTER (July

77
78

79

80

29, 2009), http://www.microsoft.com/presspass/exec/steve/2009/07-29search.mspx.
Lohr, Bing, supra note 60, at 1, 5.
Dina Bass, Microsoft Bing Adds Facebook Data, BLOOMBERG, May 16, 2011, http://
www.bloomberg.connews/2011-05-16/microsoft-s-bing-searches-add-facebook-data-toshow-what-friends-like-.html.
Senate Google Hearings, supra note 55, at 4 (Testimony of Eric Schmidt, Executive Officer,
Google Inc.).
Matt Rosoff, Microsoft Should Have Let Google Have Search to Itself, Bus. INSIDER, Apr. 20,
2011, http://www.businessinsider.com/microsoft-should-have-let-google-have-search-to-itself2011-4#ixzz1Lyx0ikow.
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III. BEHAVIORAL EXPLOITATION
As Part II discusses, firms, through trial-and-error learning, can better
predict and accommodate consumers' changing preferences. Consumers
benefit, but entry barriers can increase as well. As this part discusses, monopolists can devise better ways to exploit consumers' biases and heuristics
(such as status quo bias, framing effects, and sunk cost fallacy) to maintain
their monopoly. Through the lens of neoclassical economic theory, such behavior, rather than exploitive, appears benign. Rational consumers should
defeat the exercise of market power by switching to lower-cost substitutes
offered by fringe firms or entrants. But as this part discusses, even when information costs are low, consumers, with status quo
bias and sunk cost
8
fallacy, do not switch as neoclassical theory predicts. 1
One example is when a monopolist uses default options to maintain its
monopoly. The European Commission's abusive tying claim against
Microsoft provides a rich narrative: Microsoft premised its defense on rational choice theory. The Commission and Court of First Instance
responded with actual consumer behavior (which the behavioral economics
literature explains well). The Commission's remedy failed, as behavioral economics would predict. In its subsequent prosecution of Microsoft, the
Commission reconsidered its behavioral remedy, the benefits and risks of
which this articles examines from a behavioral economics perspective.
A. European Commission's Abusive Tying Case Against Microsoft
Microsoft had (and still has) a monopoly for personal computer operating
systems.8 2 The Commission accused Microsoft, inter alia, of tying its media
player to its operating system. Media players enable consumers to store and
play music and videos on their computers (and now on handheld devices).
Originally, RealNetworks licensed its media player to Microsoft. 3 By 1997,
senior Microsoft executives were concerned about these multimedia technologies jeopardizing Microsoft's operating system monopoly.8 4 In 1998,
Microsoft released its Microsoft Media Player, which at that time supported
8! See, e.g., U.K. INDEPENDENT COMMISSION ON BANKING, INTERIM REPORT CONSULTATION

oN REFORM OPI'oNs 33-38 (Apr. 2011) (noting how consumers do not switch banks as
often as economic theory predicts).
82 By the late 1990s, Microsoft accounted for more than 95 percent of the licensing of all
Intel-compatible PC operating systems worldwide. Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 54. "Operating
systems perform many functions, including allocating computer memory and controlling
peripherals such as printers and keyboards," found the court, including the "function as
platforms for software applications." Id. at 53. As of November 2011, Microsoft controlled
over 90 percent of that market. Net Market Share, Desktop Operating System Market Share
(May
2012),
available
at
http://www.netmarketshare.com/
operating-system-market-share.aspx?qprid=8&qpcustomd=0.
83 CFI Microsoft,
837 (noting how Microsoft included RealPlayer in its Internet Explorer
4.0).
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different formats, including Apple's QuickTime and RealNetworks'
RealAudio and RealVideo.8 5 That changed by 1999, when Microsoft
released its Windows Media Player, which "no longer provided native
support for RealNetworks' or QuickTime's formats."8 6
The Commission raised concerns about Microsoft's incorporating its
media player in its Windows operating system and the player's lack of interoperability.8 7 It found Microsoft to have abused its dominant position.
A tying claim has four elements: 88 first, Microsoft is dominant in the
market for the tying product (here personal computer operating systems)Microsoft did not dispute this element.89 Second, the tied product (the
media player) and the tying product (Microsoft's operating system) are two
separate products. 90 Third, Microsoft did not give consumers a choice to
obtain the tying product without the tied product. 9 1 Fourth, the tying forecloses competition.
What is interesting, for our purposes, is the offense's fourth element. The
European Commission, like the district court in the U.S. antitrust case,
observed how the personal computer software industry was characterized
with network effects. 9 2 The Commission argued, and Court of First
84 Microsoft, 84 F Supp. 2d at 30 (Microsoft "noted the dangers of Apple's and RealNetworks'
multimedia playback technologies, which ran on several platforms (including the Mac OS
and Windows) and similarly exposed APIs to content developers. Microsoft feared all of
these technologies because they facilitated the development of user-oriented software that
would be indifferent to the identity of the underlying operating system.").
85 CFI Microsoft,
837.
86 Id.
87 Commission Decision of 24.03.2004 Relating to a Proceeding under Article 82 of the EC

88

89

90

91

92

Treaty (Case COMP/C-3/37.792 - Microsoft), 2007 O.J. (L 32) 23,
5, http://
www.steptoe.com/assets/attachments/1868.pdf [hereinafter EC Microsoft] (second Statement
of Objections).
CFI Microsoft, l [ 842, 849.
Id.
854.
Microsoft argued that liability would punish dominant undertakings from improving their
products by integrating new features in them. A dominant firm, argued Microsoft, would be
obligated to remove its innovations whenever a third party marketed a standalone product
that provided the same or similar functionalities. Id. at
888. The United States Court of
Appeals for the D.C. Circuit was sympathetic to Microsoft's claims. The Court held that the
per se illegality standard should not apply to Microsoft's tying its Internet web browser,
Explorer, to its operating system. Microsoft, 253 F3d at 95. The Court remanded for review
under a more lenient rule of reason standard, and the United States and Microsoft settled.
In both the United States and the European Union, one evil of tying is the monopolist
"affords consumers no choice but to purchase" (not so much to use) the tied product.
Microsoft, 253 F3d at 85. See also Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Servs., Inc., 504 U.S.
451, 461-62 (1992); Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 12-18 (1984);
CFI Microsoft, ' 865 (noting how coercion was mainly applied first of all to OEMs, who then
pass it on to the end user).
One complaint was that with its operating systems monopoly (enforced by network effects),
Microsoft could ward off potential threats by tying its imitation product. Once Microsoft
added its version, the Commission found, programmers developed solutions for the
Microsoft platform because it would reach automatically 90 percent of client PC users, and
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Instance found, that such bundling "discourages investment in all the technologies in which Microsoft could conceivably take an interest in the
future." 93 Microsoft's tying of its media player to its operating system had,
the Court of First Instance found, the "inevitable consequence of affecting
relations on the market between Microsoft, OEMs and suppliers of thirdparty media players by appreciably altering the balance of competition in
favor of Microsoft and to the detriment of the other operators," such as
RealNetworks. The tying created "a disincentive for users to use third-party
media players and for [computer manufacturers] to pre-install such media
players on client PCs." 94 Given this disincentive, the Court was concerned
that the tying would weaken competition among media players "in such a
way that the maintenance of an effective competitive structure would not be
95
ensured in the near future."
B. Microsoft's Defense Premised on Rational Choice Theory
Under neoclassical economic theory, it is difficult to see any significant foreclosure and resulting harm to competition. Microsoft's Windows Media
Player came with the Windows operating system. But no one disputed that
consumers, after unpacking the computer and starting it up, could search
the Internet for the media player they want, download the software to their
computer, and use that media player to stream music or videos. 9 6 The
Commission never argued that consumers were unaware of other competing
media players. This was unlikely. Consumers presumably knew of
RealNetworks' media player-it was part of Microsoft's earlier operating
system.
Nor were consumers or the OEMs disadvantaged if they selected an alternative media player. 97 After the U.S. antitrust consent decree, Microsoft
could not design its operating system to hamper rival media players, as it
earlier did with its Internet browser. 98 Nor could Microsoft contractually

thus save the content providers the costs of supporting different technology platforms. EC
Microsoft, supra note 87, 1!880. Under this positive feed-back loop, more users of a given
software platform lead to a greater incentive to develop products compatible with that
platform, which reinforces that platform's popularity with end-users (and the software
company's market power). Id. 1!882. Thus Microsoft chilled the incentives for potential
innovators to challenge the entrenched monopolist. Id. 4' 891.
93 Microsoft, 2007 E.C.R. 11-3601.
94 Press and Information, CJE/07/63, Press Release No. 63/07, Judgment of the Court of First
Instance in Case T-201/04, Microsoft Corp. v Comm'n of the European Cmtys. (Sept. 17,
2007).
95 Id.
96 CFI Microsoft,

829. Moreover, media players may be sold in retail outlets or distributed
with other software products. Id. 4 830.
97 Id. " 995.
98 EC Microsoft, supra note 87, 4 796 n.922.

Behavioral Antitrust and Monopolization

563

require software developers, content providers, or anyone else to distribute
or promote exclusively or mainly its Windows Media Player.9 9 Microsoft's
operating system could run one or more media players without affecting the
media players' performance.' 0 0
Nor were consumers forced to use Microsoft's player. Consumers could
set another media player as the default option. 1 1 As the Commission and
Court of First Instance observed, a "not insignificant number of customers
continue to acquire media players from Microsoft's competitors, separately
from their client PC operating system, which shows that they regard the two
products as separate."' 2 At the time of litigation, consumers used on
0 3
average 1.7 media players each month, and that number was increasing.'
Consequently, how could Microsoft foreclose competition when consumers
could download (often for free) Apple's and RealNetworks' alternative
10 4
media players off the Internet?
One could strain under rational choice theory to find coercion. First, con05
sumers must expend some time and effort to download a media player.'
This can take longer for users without broadband Internet service. Second,
computer manufacturers and consumers could not delete Microsoft's media
0 7
player. 0 6 Any media player would be in addition to Microsoft's product.1
Thus, the computer memory, used by Microsoft's media player, could not
be used for other purposes. Third, Microsoft devised its software so that its
Player could override the consumer's default setting and reappear when the
consumer used Microsoft's web browser, Internet Explorer, to access media
files streamed over the Internet.10 8
While annoying, these factors hardly justify a finding of foreclosure. If
other media players offered superior performance for free (or at an attractive
99 CFI Microsoft, ' 995 (no exclusivity provisions).
'e0 Id." 993.
101 Id. 4 952.
102 Id. "932.
103 Id.
953.
104 The Commission questioned the extent the media players were free: "Third-party media

players offering all the functionality of WMP are often not given away for free. Microsoft's
argument that 'media player vendors have business models in which they give away most
copies of their products' therefore has to be taken with a degree of caution. It would indeed
appear that users feel still less inclined to buy a second media player-even though it offers
more functionality than a basic free version of the same brand-where they have already
obtained a comparable full-fledged media player pre-installed on their PC." EC Microsoft,
supra note 87, 4'847 (footnotes omitted). Consumers today can download a free copy of
RealPlayer

105

106

107 Id. 11 946.
1o

(at

http://www.real.com/realplayer),

QuickTime

(at

http://www.apple.com/

quicktime/download/), and other media players (at http://download.cnet.com/windows/
media-players/).
Id. "' 866-67. The scarcity of broadband Internet, slower download times, and failed
downloads also may have contributed to consumers' sticking with the default.
GH Microsoft, "' 832, 837.
Id. 4"974.
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price), 10 9 then rational consumers would incur these costs to acquire a competing media player. Put simply, if the benefits of using a competing media
player outweigh the costs, rational consumers would switch. Since rational
110
consumers would switch to alternative media players of "better quality,"'
then software programmers and music companies would continue to
support the superior players' formats. Microsoft's attempt to thwart the
competitive threat of middleware (or leverage its monopoly to the media
player market) would fail.
If most consumers (1) did not purchase Windows N (the version of
Microsoft's operating system without its Windows Media Player) and (2) did
not download RealNetworks' and Apple's competing media players when
they readily could have, then this behavior, under neoclassical economics
theory, is consistent with competition on the merits. Rational consumers
could and would switch to superior media players. If consumers did not
switch, then Microsoft's media player must equal (or surpass) competing
media players.
Here is the problem. Windows Media Player's growth, as Microsoft recognized, was not attributable to its superior quality over rival products."' "In
fact, Microsoft's own October 2003 submission illustrates that the reviews
presented (1999-2003) rate the best product to be RealNetworks' player
more often than WMP [Windows Media Player]. ' 112 Consequently, fewer
consumers than neoclassical economic theory predicted were switching to
superior media players.

C. The Commission and Court of First Instance's Response of
Actual Consumer Behavior
For a rational choice theorist, the default option (assuming low transactions
costs and no informational asymmetries) should not matter. Say consumers
prefer Windows Media Player. If computer manufacturers installed another
media player, then consumers would switch to Windows Media Player. So
whatever the default option, consumers should readily opt for the superior
media player.
But as the behavioral economics literature shows, the setting of the
default can often determine the outcome (even when transaction costs are
nominal). 113 Default options have played an important role in participation
and investments in retirement savings, contractual choices in health-clubs,
1o9

EC Microsoft, supra note 87, '11 847-48.

"l0 CFI Microsoft, -, 971.

.. Id. [ 1057.
112 EC Microsoft, supra note 87, ! 948.
13

RICHARD H.

THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING

HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 78

(Yale Univ. Press 2008).
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organ donations, car insurance plans, and participation in class actions."14
The U.S. district court in the Google book search action observed that
many concerns over the proposed settlement would be "ameliorated" if the
15
settlement were converted from an "opt-out" to an "opt-in" settlement.,
Not surprisingly, firms and consumers can have different preferences over
6
the default option."
Microsoft preferred having its inferior media player as the default choice,
thereby requiring consumers to opt out. As Microsoft recognized, some consumers would reject the default media player and download a rival player.
But many consumers would stick with the default media player.
Consequently, the Court of First Instance recognized that consumers "who
find Windows Media Player pre-installed on their client PCs are generally
less inclined to use another media player."' " 17 The European Commission
was blunter: "A supply-side aspect to consider is that, while downloading is
in itself a technically inexpensive way of distributing media players, vendors
must expend resources to overcome end-users' inertia and persuade them to
ignore the pre-installation of [Windows Media Player] ."118 Nor is inertia the
only factor at work. Some non-computer-savvy consumers may believe that
the default option represents the OEM's choice of the superior media
player.' 19 Status quo bias explains why many consumers remain with the
default option, even though neoclassical theory predicts that many consumers would download superior alternative media browsers.
The facts did not support Microsoft's neoclassical economic theory. But
Microsoft argued that the facts contradicted the Commission's behavioral
explanation. Downloading was a viable mechanism to distribute a media
player, Microsoft argued, as "more than 100 million copies of WMP 9 were
114

Id. at 129-30; Stefano DellaVigna, Psychology and Economics: Evidence from the Field, 47
J. ECON. Lrr. 315, 322 n. 11(2009); Eric J. Johnson, Steven Bellman & Gerald L. Lohse
Defaults, Framing and Pivacy: Why Opting In-Opting Out, 13 MARKETING LETERS 5

(2003) (consent to receive e-mail marketing); C. Whan Park, Sung Youl Jun & Deborah
J. Maclnnis, Choosing What I Want Versus Rejecting What I Do Not Want: An Application of
Decision Framing to Product Option Choice Decisions, 37 J. MARKETING RES. 187 (2000) (car
option purchases); EUROPEAN CONSUMER CONSULTATIVE GROUP, OPINION ON PRIVATE

DAMAGES ACTIONS 4 (2010), available at http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/empowerment
docs/ECCGopinionon-actions for damages_18112010.pdf (in European countries,
where consumers had to opt into the class, the rate of participation in class actions for
consumer claims was less than one percent; whereas under opt-out regimes (where the
default is that one is a class member unless one opts out), participation rates were typically
very high (97 percent in the Netherlands and almost 100 percent in Portugal)).
115 Author's Guild v. Google Inc., 770 F Supp. 2d 666, 686 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
116 74 Federal Register 59036 (Nov. 17, 2009), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/
newsevents/press/bcreg/bcreg20100219al.pdf (majority of surveyed participants preferred
setting the default as opt-in (consumers having to opt into the bank's overdraft program)
rather than having to opt out (which many banks preferred)).
117 CFI Microsoft, [980.
118 EC Microsoft, supra note 87, "870 (quoted in CFI Microsoft, 4' 1052).
119

CF1Microsoft,4, 1050.
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downloaded in the ten months the software was available to the general
public."'120 If many consumers would remain with the default option, then
logically consumers would stick not only with the default media player, but
also with that version of the media player. If consumers overcame status quo
bias to upgrade their default media player, then, arguably, they could
upgrade to any media player.
The Commission found that these upgraded "copies were downloaded by
people who already had a version of Windows Media Player installed on
their PCs."' 2 1 Tellingly Microsoft did not rely on its consumers to search for
and download software updates. Instead, Microsoft nudged its consumers.
Microsoft designed its personal computer software to independently and
regularly look for upgrades on Microsoft's web site, and to prompt the user
to download it. 12 2 Moreover, since consumers procrastinate, Microsoft "reMedia Player if
peatedly" prompted the consumer to download its2 upgraded
3
consumers chose not to do so at the first prompt.1
So the European Commission recognized the default option matters.
Regulators and the industry will battle over whether consumers need to
opt-out or opt-in. If Microsoft seriously considered downloading as "an
equivalent alternative to pre-installation," observed the European
its current privilCommission, then Microsoft's "insistence on maintaining
124
inconsistent."'
appears
pre-installation
ege of automatic
Besides status quo bias, there is also the sunk cost fallacy. Consumers,
under neoclassical economic theory, "ignore sunk costs (costs that cannot
be recovered, such as the cost of nonrefundable tickets).' 2 5 Consumers
instead consider the costs and benefits going forward. To illustrate:
Assume that you have spent $100 on a ticket for a weekend ski trip to Michigan. Several
weeks later you buy a $50 ticket for a weekend ski trip to Wisconsin. You think you will
enjoy the Wisconsin ski trip more than the Michigan ski trip. As you are putting your
just-purchased Wisconsin ski trip ticket in your wallet, you notice that the Michigan ski
trip and the Wisconsin ski trip are for the same weekend! It's too late to sell either ticket,
either one. You must use one ticket and not the other. Which ski
and you cannot return
26
trip will you go on?1

The $50 and $100 costs are effectively sunk. Under neoclassical economic
theory, consumers would consider the costs/benefits going forward and
choose the more enjoyable Wisconsin ski trip. But more people, in response
120

EC Microsoft, supra note 87, 1 864.

121

Id.
Id.
Id.

122
123

125

Id. 871.
Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to Law and

126

Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1482 (1998).
Hal R. Arkes & Catherine Blumer, The Psychology of Sunk Cost, 35 ORG. BEHAV. & HUM.

124

DECISION PROCESSES 124, 126 (1985).
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to this question, chose the Michigan trip.12 7 Accordingly, firms, governments, and consumers, under the sunk cost fallacy, "throw good
time and
12 8
money after bad even when the logical decision is to cut bait."'
Monopolists can use the sunk cost fallacy to maintain their monopoly.
Consumers, for example, can invest significant costs in downloading songs
and movies, creating play lists, and organizing their music and videos on
their media players. These costs are effectively sunk. For rational consumers,
the sunk costs invested in Windows Media Player are irrelevant. Knowing
they will continue to download music and movies, consumers would consider the benefits and costs going forward with alternative media players.
But consumers, under sunk cost fallacy, would not want their earlier time,
expense, and effort wasted; so they continue using Windows Media Player

until a disruptive innovation (like Apple's iPod, iPhone, and iPad) comes
29

along. 1

To lock-in consumers, monopolists, besides reducing interoperability,' 3 °
can remind consumers of their sunk costs, even though the consumer going
forward would be better off opting out. The sunk cost fallacy magnifies the
switching costs, thereby increasing the "locked-in" effect and the level of
price increases (or reduced quality or services) consumers will tolerate
before switching to alternatives.' 31

127 Id. at 126 (33 opted for Michigan, versus 28 for Wisconsin).
128 Malcolm Baker, Richard S. Ruback & Jeffrey Wurgler, Behavioral Corporate Finance: A
Survey 49 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 10863, 2004); Janky
v. Batistatos, 2008 WL 4411504, at *1 (N.D. Ind. Sept. 25, 2008) (noting how "from the
acorn of a relatively minor copyright dispute a mighty oak tree of litigation has resulted-two
federal cases, three federal appeals, a state case, and several rounds of sanctions").
129 Interestingly, Apple is currently being sued for encoding its digital music files with its
proprietary digital rights management software that only allow digital music files purchased
from Apple's iTunes Store to be played directly on iPods; the files could not be played
directly on competitors' digital music players. Apple allegedly prevented digital music files
sold at other companies' online music stores from being played on iPods. Plaintiffs in the
private antitrust claim allege that Apple sought to foreclose RealNetworks, which in 2004,
announced that its digital music files could be played on iPods. When Apple's updates to
the software were released in October 2004, plaintiffs allege that "users were forced to
update their iTunes applications and iPods, the digital music files from RealNetworks'
online store were no longer interoperable with Apple's iPods." Apple iPod iTunes Antitrust
Litigation, Slip Copy, 2011 WL 976942, at *1 (N.D.Cal. Mar. 21, 2011).
130 Compl. " 194, RealNetworks, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 2003 WL 23145603 (N.D.Cal.Dec.
18, 2003) (alleging that Microsoft "reduced the interoperability of RealNetworks' products
with Microsoft's operating systems" to thwart consumers from transferring their media
library to rival players). Microsoft eventually entered three agreements valued at $761
million to RealNetworks to settle the antitrust case and create a new partnership. Press
Release, Microsoft Corp., Microsoft and RealNetworks Resolve Antitrust Case and
Announce Digital Music and Games Partnership (Oct. 11, 2005), available at http://
www.microsoft.com/presspass/press/2005/octO5/10-1 1msrealpr.mspx.
131 Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, Inc., 504 U.S. 451 (1992).
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D. The Shortcomings of the Commission's Remedy
One issue with status quo bias is determining an appropriate remedy. The
Commission, according to Microsoft, believed there would not be an abusive
tie if Microsoft offered at the same price two versions of its operating system:
one with Windows Media Player and one without. 132 As its principal remedy,
the Commission and Court allowed Microsoft "the right to continue to offer
the version of Windows bundled with Windows Media Player and that it is
required only to make it possible for consumers to obtain the operating
system without that media player."' 33 Suppose you could choose between two
Windows operating systems: one with and one without Windows Media
Player. Both cost the same amount. Which would you choose?
The remedy was ineffectual.134 As Microsoft accurately predicted, no one
would demand the operating system without the media player. 1 35 One need
shortcomings, but
not be a behavioral economist to predict the remedy's
36
prospect theory helps explain why the remedy failed. 1
Under neoclassical expected utility theory, people weigh the utilities of
outcomes by their probabilities.' 37 Prospect theory, borne out from behavioral experiments, has four important findings.
First, when it comes to sure gains, people are more risk adverse.' 38 More
people opt for the sure gain ($3000) rather than the higher discounted value
9
represented by the gamble (an 80-percent likelihood of winning $4000). '
Second, when faced with a sure loss, people become risk seeking. More
people now opt for the gamble (an 80-percent likelihood of paying $4000)
rather than paying the sure loss ($3000).140 Third, the consumer's response
will vary if the option is perceived as avoiding a loss (consumers more risk
seeking) or as a sure gain (consumers more risk adverse).141 Fourth, losses
132 CFI Microsoft, - 891. The EC denied making this admission in its decision. Id. at 908.
133EC Press Release No 63/07, Judgment of the Court of First Instance in Case T-201/04,
Microsoft Corp. v. Comm'n of the European Cmtys. (Sept. 17, 2007), available at http://
europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=CJE/07/63&format=HTML&aged=o
&language=EN&guiLanguage=en.
134 Kevin J. O'Brien, As EU Debated, Microsoft Took Market Share, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 16, 2007,
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/16/business/worldbusiness/1 6iht-msftl 7.1.7522119.html

(noting that settlement perceived as a "commercial flop"); Scherer, supra note 49, at 45
(characterizing remedy as "an abject failure").
135CFI Microsoft, MI891 (noting also how Microsoft argued that this lack of demand supported
its contention that "'Windows with media functionality' is a single product").
136 Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk, 47
ECONOMETRICA 263 (1979).
137Id. at 265.
138 Id. (people in the experiments "overweight outcomes that are considered certain, relative to

outcomes which are merely probable").
139 Id. at 266.
140 Id. at 268.
141 Daniel Kahneman, Maps of Bounded Rationality: Psychology for Behavioral Economics, 93 AM.

ECON. REv. 1449, 1458 (2003) (Asian disease).
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closer to a reference point hurt more than twice the joy from comparable
gains. 142 Suppose one could measure happiness and sadness in standard
units (say utils). Prospect theory predicts that if the joy in finding $100 1were
43
100 utils, then pain in losing $100 would be between 200 and 250 utils.
Framings effects and the reference point matter. One example is surcharges for paying with a credit card or obtaining a discount for paying with
cash. The merchant bears different cost for accepting different credit cards.
The merchant has two ways to characterize the reference point: first as a
lower cash price with an imposed surcharge for customers using a credit card
with a higher interchange fee. Alternatively, the merchant can set the credit
price as the reference point and offer consumers a discount if they paid with
cash (or a credit or debit card with a lower interchange fee). The net price is
the same. How the choice is framed should not affect the outcome. After
the credit card companies' No-Discrimination Rule was abolished, Dutch
merchants could impose surcharges or offer discounts based on how the customer was going to pay. Of the consumers surveyed, seventy-four percent
thought it (very) bad if a merchant asked for a surcharge for using a credit
card. But when asked about a merchant offering a discount, only forty-nine
percent neutral and twentypercent thought it (very) bad, with twenty-two
14 4
one percent saying it is a (very) good thing.
Whether the Commission's remedy is perceived as a loss or a gain
depends on the reference point. The Commission's remedy failed when the
reference point was the bundled product, namely an operating system with a
media player. The Commission's remedy was a perceived loss in two
aspects: getting a "degraded" product (the Windows product without a
media player) 14 5 and effectively paying more for it. Under prospect theory,
the perceived loss of one media player (in opting for the operating system
without any media player) would 46
hurt twice as much as the gain in adding a
media player of one's choosing. 1
The failure of the Commission's remedy does not establish by itself the
desirability of Microsoft's media player. Prospect theory predicts that consumers would opt for any functional media player coupled with Windows over
a Windows-only product. The Commission put itself in an awkward position
when it chose as the reference point a bundled operating system, namely an
operating system that came with a media player. The Commission believed
that consumers and computer manufacturers could choose which
Id. at 1456.
143Id.
144 ITM REsEARCH, THE ABOLITON OF THE No-DISCIMJATION RuLE 7-8 (Mar. 2000),
142

availableat http://www.creditslips.org/files/netherlands-no-discrimination-rule-study.pdf.
145 CFI Microsoft, [ 1171.

146 The European Commission believed that OEMs would respond to consumer expectations
by pre-installing another media player on the version without Windows Media Player. Id. [
1204.
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competitor's media player, if any, they wanted. Although the Commission
properly insisted that the operating system and media player were two separate products, they were nonetheless complementary products. The
Commission implicitly believed consumers would derive greater satisfaction
in choosing a media player (than the pain they felt in not getting a media
player with the operating system).
One alternative solution was differential pricing. Suppose one could
measure in money the utility one derived from getting Windows Media
Player with the operating system. The Commission could require Microsoft
to discount its Windows operating system without Windows Media Player
by 2 to 2.5 times that amount. One problem is that this utility measure does
not necessarily comport with Microsoft's costs. Plus, the remedy increases
the Commission's regulatory role for a product that is freely available on the
Internet. 14 7 This option is undesirable.
Instead, under prospect theory, the European Commission should have
moved the reference point in the opposite direction such that consumers
would have perceived a Microsoft Windows operating system with its Media
Player as a loss. The Commission never asserted that operating systems and
media players were unrelated. Rather, the Commission correctly asserted
that it was unnecessary for Microsoft's media player to be bundled with its
operating system. Thus, the Commission could have established as the reference point an operating system that came with the choice among several
media players. Now the reference point is a Windows operating system with
the choice of three media players. So now suppose you can choose between
a Windows product that came with the choice of three media players and
one that came only with Windows Media Player. Which would you choose?
Consumers would likely perceive a Windows operating system that comes
only with one option (Windows Media Player) as a perceived loss. So the
loss of two additional options would likely hurt far more than the pleasure
gained from not having to choose among the three options. Moreover consumers prefer having some choices rather than no choice.

E. The Commission's Reappraisal of its Behavioral Remedy in the
Internet Browser Settlement
The Commission learned from its mistake. It experimented with this superior reference point when it later challenged Microsoft for tying its web
browser, Internet Explorer, to its personal computer operating system,
Windows. 1 48 Before the settlement, consumers who used Windows had
147 Id. 41968.
148 Press Release, European Commission, Antitrust: Commission Welcomes Microsoft's Roll-Out
of Web Browser Choice, IP/10/216 (Mar. 2, 2010), avadable at http://europa.eu/rapid/
pressReleasesAction.doreference=IP/10/216&format=HT.MJ&aged=0&language=EN.
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Microsoft's Internet Explorer as their default web browser. Although consumers could download other web browsers from the Internet, many did not,
a function not attributable necessarily to the
superiority of Microsoft's
49
Internet browser but again to status quo bias.1
With its experience from its media player remedy, the Commission
shifted to the superior reference point: "'The commission had suggested to
Microsoft that consumers be provided with a choice of web browsers,' the
EC wrote regarding the standalone software proposal. 1 5'Rather
than more
0
choice, Microsoft seems to have chosen to provide less."'
As part of its settlement, Microsoft must provide a Browser Choice
Screen to consumers within the European Economic Area for five years.
Rather than having one Internet browser as the default, computer users
must choose whether they want a browser, and if so, which browser they
151
want to install from the competing web browsers listed on the screen.
Five Internet browsers are identified, with a short description of each, along
with links for further information. 152

F. The Remedy's Advantages and Shortcomings
The Commission's browser remedy is superior under prospect theory to its
earlier media player remedy. How effective the settlement has been to date is
another matter.
On the one hand, Microsoft's share of the European browser market
declined after the settlement-from 44.9 percent in January 2010 to 39.8
percent in October 2010.153 Microsoft has a lower market share in the
European Union, where consumers are given a choice, than elsewhere in the
1 54
world, where Windows users must download an alternative browser.
149 Shane

Frederick, Automated Choice Heuristics, in HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE
PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITVE JUDGMENT 555 (Thomas Gilovich, Dale Griffin & Daniel

150

151

152
153

154

Kahneman eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 2002) (summarizing experimental evidence of
peopling preferring current options over other options to a degree that is difficult to justify).
Ryan Singel, EU Criticizes Microsoft's JE Unbundling, but Does It Matter Anymore?. WIRED,
June 12, 2009, http://www.wired.com/business/2009/06/eu-criticizes-microsofts-ie-unbundling-but-does-it-matter-anymore/.
Summary of Commission Decision of 16 December 2009 Relating to a Proceeding under
Article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and Article 54 of the
EEA Agreement (Case COMP/39.530 - Microsoft (Tying)), 2010 O.J. (C 36) 06, available
at http://eur-lex.europa.euLexUriServ/LexUriServ.douri=OJ:C:2010:036:0007:0008:EN:PDF
Browser Choice, Select Your Web Browser(s), http://www.browserchoice.eu/BrowserChoice/
browserchoiceen.htm.
In 2009, Microsoft's share declined by 5.5 percentage points; in 2008 by 8 points. Kevin
J. O'Brien, European Antitrust Deal With Microsoft Barely Affects BrowserMarket, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 10, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/20 10/10/1 /technology/Il eubrowser.html?ref=
business.
As of April 2011, Microsoft's Internet Explorer accounted for 55.11 percent of the global
usage of browsers, Mozilla's Firefox had 21.63 percent, Google's Chrome had 11.94
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Moreover, according to one report, downloads of Opera Software's desktop
browser "increased in number significantly after Microsoft started offering
Windows users in Europe a choice in browser with a so-called ballot screen"
with "on average, more than half of the European downloads of Opera's
latest browser com[ing] directly from that Choice Screen."' 5 5 The remedy
enables consumers to easily choose a browser; it increases the likelihood that
the market share reflects more the consumers' informed choice, rather than
5 6

the monopolist's.1

On the other hand, even before the settlement, Microsoft's browser
market share was declining.' 57 Microsoft's share could have declined absent
the remedy. But a greater issue is choice overload. Providing consumers
some choice is better than no choice. But, providing more choices as the
remedy has at least two limitations.
First, offering too many choices can be self-defeating. For example,
having consumers choose among sixteen options may lead to a worse
outcome than choosing among five. Consumers may demand more choices
than they actually prefer. Under loss aversion, consumers hate giving up
options and restricting their choice set.1 5 8 But when faced with many
choices, some consumers avoid choosing any option, even when the choice
of opting out has negative consequences for future well-being.' 59 Other consumers choose an option, but have lower confidence in their choice and
greater dissatisfaction in choosing. Thus too many choices can lead to a

155

percent, and Apple's Safari held 7.15 percent. Net Market Share, Browser Market Share,
http://marketshare.hitslink.com/browser-market-share.aspx?qprid=0&qptimeframe=M.
Robin Wauters, Microsoft's European Browser Choice Screen Causes Spike in Opera Downloads,
Mar. 18, 2010, http://techcrunch.com/2010/03/18/microsofts-europeanbrowser-choice-screen-causes-spike-in-opera-downloads/
Ciriolo, supra note 10, at 3 (noting how 25 percent of the consumers who viewed the
TECH CRUNCH,

156

Choice Screen chose an alternative browser).
157 Id.
158

In one computer experiment, participants tried to keep options

open even when

counter-productive. DAN ARiELY, PREDICTABLY IRRATIONAL: THE HIDDEN FORCES THAT
SHAPE OUR DECISIONS 142-48 (2008). In the Door Game, each MIT student could click
on three doors on the computer screen to find the room with the biggest payoff (between 1
and 10 cents). Each student was given 100 clicks, and could click one door as many times
possible without a penalty. Each time the student sampled another door, that switch cost
the student one additional click. Experiment 2, the Disappearing Door Game, was the
same as the Door Game except each time a door was left unvisited for 12 clicks, it
disappeared forever. To keep options open, participants in Experiment 2 ended up making
substantially less money (about fifteen percent less) than participants in Experiment
1. Participants would have made more money by sticking to one door. Id. at 147. A similar
result occurred when participants were told the exact monetary outcome they could expect
from each room.
159 Botti & Iyengar, supra note 53, at 25 (discussing information overload, where an increase in
options raises the cognitive costs in comparing and evaluating the options and leads to
suboptimal decision strategies).
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worse result for consumers
and firms, such as not choosing any browser or
60

regretting one's choice.'
A second shortcoming with the Commission's choice screen remedy is
the lack of any feedback loop, whereby consumers can test the products and
compare their performance. For search engines, the consumer can see the
number and quality of results for a search term. But benchmarking web
browsers and media players may be harder. To the extent the choice screen
provides consumers a way to compare the products' performance on
popular metrics, the more likely the consumer's choice will be informed.

IV. CONCLUSION
By enriching competition policy with the behavioral economic findings, we
can see the importance of trial-and-error feedback loops to the competitive
process, and as a potential entry barrier. We can see how monopolists can
use heuristics and biases (such as the status quo bias) to maintain their
monopoly. We also can see how the antitrust authority can use behavioral
economics to design better remedies.
One may question the extent to which defaults matter going forward for
technological innovation. Consumers arguably are more comfortable with
computer technology. Indeed Apple's Steve Jobs discussed the post-personal
computer world of handheld devices, 16 1 where Microsoft lagged. 16 2 Many
consumers today search and download applications (apps) for their mobile
telephones and iPads. 163 Downloading itself may become dated with cloud
computing. It is fitting that the same week that the United States antitrust
160

The bounded rational firms, as a result, lose sales opportunities of their products. Iyengar
and Lepper, in their famous experiment, set up a tasting booth in an upscale grocery store.
The booth displayed either six or twenty-four different flavors of jam. A greater percentage
of the shoppers stopped to sample one of the displayed jams when the booth had
twenty-four jam flavors (60 percent versus 40 percent when booth displayed six jam
flavors). But a lower percentage actually purchased a jar of jam (3 percent versus 30 percent
of customers when booth had only six flavors). Sheena S. Iyengar & Mark R. Lepper, When
Choice Is Demotivating: Can One Desire Too Much of a Good Thing?, 79 J. PERSONALrrY &
SOC. PSYCHOL. 995 (2000).

161 Brier Dudley, Feisty Steve Jobs Talks Up Apple's 'Pbst-PC'iPad 2, SEATnE TIMES, Mar. 2, 2011,
162

http://o.seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/businesstechnology/2014381153-_brierO3.html.
In a recent Nielsen survey of U.S. mobile consumers for January 2011 to March 2011, 31
percent of consumers who plan to get a new smartphone indicated that Android was now
their preferred operating system, 30 percent preferred Apple's iOS, 11 percent identified
RIM/Blackberry, and 6 percent identified Windows Phone devices (nearly 20 percent were
unsure what to choose next). Robin Wauters, Nielsen: Consumer Desire for Android Grows,
Unlike iOS and Blackberry, TECH CRUNCH, Apr. 26, 2011, http://techcrunch.com/2011/04/
26/nielsen-consumer-desire-for-android-grows-unlike-ios-and-blackberry/.

163
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consent decree with Microsoft expired, two other things happened. First,
Google announced its Chromebook, whereby the user accesses its data and
applications through the Internet. The computer has no operating system
(which would require downloads, updates, and so forth). As advertised, it
can be thrown into a lake without losing any data. Second, Microsoft
announced its purchase of Skype. Microsoft hopes Skype will provide
greater inroads in social networks, which, like Facebook, the most popular
164
visited site, do not require downloads, but can be accessed anywhere.
Moreover, the European Commission was unconcerned about Microsoft's
tying Skype to its operating system, as consumers appeared comfortable
downloading other versions.165
Nonetheless defaults will continue to be an issue. Competitors in South
Korea, for example, have complained to the Korean FTC of Google offering
its Android system for free with smartphones.1 66 Android smartphones use
Google as the default search engine.1 67 Google notes that Microsoft's Bing
has gained in popularity, "perhaps because it comes pre-installed as the
search default on over 70 percent of new computers sold."' 168 Bing is "also
the exclusive search provider for Yahoo! and Facebook."' 16 9 It is technically
possible to switch to competing search applications, but the competitors
argue, as did Microsoft's competitors in the earlier antitrust cases, it is not
easy. 170 They complain that their applications cannot be preloaded on the
smartphone.171
Consequently, besides the familiar arsenal of exclusionary and predatory
practices, monopolists will exploit consumer biases and heuristics, such as
status quo bias and the sunk cost fallacy, to attain or maintain their monopoly. The advances in behavioral economics can help explain the behavior
observed in the marketplace and design better remedies.
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